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ABSTRACT

The mind as it is found in Aristotle‟s great work De Anima is a special capacity of the
soul. It has both active and passive properties that work together to allow discursive thinking
and moral ethical behavior to emerge. This work will look at Aristotle‟s philosophy of mind,
and I will forward a new interpretation of the mind as he understood it: what I call the active and
passive mind property dualism. Aristotle‟s four causes allow for a unique application of a form
of dualism that accounts for the ontological status of the mind and the emergence of rational
thinking. The importance of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle‟s metaphysics gives a
different sort of formulation of the mind-body problem than is traditionally understood in the
philosophy of mind. The first section of this paper will look at the terms used, especially
actuality and potentiality. A comparison to Plato‟s tripartite soul will be given. Next, Aristotle‟s
different kinds of soul and their varied capacities will be explored. Finally, the active mind will
be explained as it appears in Book III, chapter 5.
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INTRODUCTION
The human mind is a special feature of life on this planet. Some of those who speak of
the mind define it by physical processes or as an organizational term to bring together thoughts
of emotion, identity, intelligence and even spirit. The word psyche can be used to express these
same terms, which means basically the same thing – the mind. Dictionaries can be found to
define these terms as being opposed to the body, yet contemporary thinkers do best by rejecting
Cartesian dualism of mind and body, in order to be taken seriously. Embodiment is thought by
many to be the proper way to view the human mind. Material monism enables one to drop any
unnecessary explanations or definitions that expand the mind beyond the body or the
environment. Yet, the mind as a mysterious and independent force still emerges intuitively. In
the works of Plato, the mind is synonymous with the human soul and the words psuche and nous
are used almost interchangeably. In De Anima, Aristotle questions if the mind is separate from
material substances and sees motion and change as the formal causes of life. For Plato the soul,
and extended terms such as mind, is entombed and separate from the ultimate reality. But for
Aristotle the active mind is of the same divine nature as the Prime Mover.
When entering into the philosophy of mind, one may begin with first order questions
such as: What are the properties of the mind? Let us look into the distant past of ancient Greek
philosophy and see where the philosophy of mind begins to appear. Aristotle may not be the first
to theorize about the human soul or the power of thought, but his separation of the human mind
from the soul is a great place to begin. Leibniz tells us that we will never find the actual cog in
the machine that is responsible for perception. Is this true? No one knows for certain, at least
not for now.
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The first section of this work will briefly look at the terms nous, psuche, dunamis and
entelécheia to see how Aristotle and Plato use them, and how they are often translated. The
following section will consider Plato's tripartite soul as it is related to Aristotle's metaphysics and
knowledge of the soul. This will lead us to focus on the nature of mental activity and the
capacities of the soul. This will allow us to extract a clear idea of what the mind is and is not. I
wish to explore Aristotle's great work De Anima and try to give an accurate demonstration of the
mind and discover how this account compares to current modes of thought on the subject. This
will help us question the accuracy of defining his theories with contemporary terms.

ETYMOLOGY
In the study of Aristotle one must choose translations carefully. The title De Anima uses
Latin words, but the original title is Peri Psyches.1 The word anima in Latin takes on several
meanings to include breath, wind, air, soul and vital principle. If we take the Greek word
psyches to mean the exact same as its Latin transliteration into anima, we find that motion, the
vital principle force of live and the animator of all natural bodies is the essence of the word soul.
The result of which is a need for modern thinkers to set aside meanings ascribed to the soul that
include eternal personality and a personal God, in order to understand Aristotle. The word
psyche is close to the ideas that we might also relate to the mind, but the word psyches is used in
conjunction with anima. The psychological functions of a human are the principles of change
and motion, being exercised by that which has potential and matter. For Aristotle, whether we
speak of Socrates or a plant, the principle source of motion is the same. These two living beings
only differ in kind. Today we think of psychology as the study of metal processes, conscious
2

and unconscious. But for Aristotle, to study the psyche is to look at the entelechy of the
composite substance of form and matter. Psychology would translate, for Aristotle, to the study
of the soul. The mind is translated as the Latin word nous. It is something separate and distinct.
In De Anima, realization and actualization play an important role in the three different
substances of form, matter and the composite of both form and matter. Dunamis is matter and
entelécheia is form.2 The dunamis is also the potential that is in matter. The entelécheia of form
is realization or actuality. Aristotle uses the word actuality in two senses and states them as the
“possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.”3 Charlton says that the exercise of knowledge
is contemplation and goes on to say that the soul is the actualization of form in knowledge.
Charlton states, “[i]t should read not 'the soul is the first actuality', but 'the soul is the actuality in
the first way.”4 That is to say that the soul is the actuality of the possession of Knowledge. This
can lead to the reasonable assertion that knowledge is not proper to the mind, but is rather shared
with those kinds of souls that contain the faculties of imagination and thought. Animals share
with us these faculties of the appetitive soul, which uses emotion and desire and also the exercise
of knowledge and perception.
The motion of the soul is the actualization of potentiality. If we have the potential that is
contained in energeia, then the living creature can realize the potential in dunamis.

“Dunamis

and energeia, in connection with change, mean 'power' and 'exercise' or 'potentiality' and
'actualization', and contemplation is an entelécheia in the sense that it is an exercise of power.”5
The form of an individual, that is always with its matter substance, can only be in actualization
or actualized. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that, “[a] linguistic analysis shows
that, by actuality, Aristotle means both energeia, which means being-at-work, and entelechia,
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which means being-at-an-end. These two words, although they have different meanings, function
as synonyms in Aristotle‟s scheme.”6 Careful consideration of the usage of these terms can lead
one to think that Aristotle is not using these two terms as synonyms. Aristotle says that things
are “in dunamis” as the statue is in the bronze; and things are “in energeia” as they are actually
existing.7 Aristotle may use the words “in entelechia,” but to mean the realized potential in
form, not in the sense that something is in the state of actualizing potentiality (energeia.) For the
change from the power to do something (dunamis) to the state of actualizing thought or life, we
should find Aristotle using the term energeia. But to fully analyze the full truth of this statement
would require a working knowledge of the ancient Greek and Latin languages, and access to the
original source material. Still, it is reasonable to think that he is using a fine nuance that should
prove critical to understanding his philosophy. This is especially true when he has created the
words in order to use them in explaining his concepts. Any reading of Aristotle that uses these
two terms synonymously should be considered closely, and it is certain to have been many times.
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THE TRIPARTITE SOUL
An inquiry into Aristotle's philosophy of mind best begins with a comparison to Plato's
tripartite soul. In Plato's treatise the Republic the three distinct classes of citizens work by the
principle of specialization and are the grounds for true justice. Justice in the kallipolis, or ideal
city, is a result of the structured soul and is like a healthy mind. The appetite or lowest function
of the soul and its corresponding merchant class live with the sensible. The merchant class with
the auxiliary and guardian classes shares the ideals of temperance and justice. In addition, the
auxiliary class must have courage and is represented in the corresponding spirited element of the
soul. The guardian class has all three of these virtues and additionally must have knowledge of
the forms and possession of wisdom. Socrates states in The Republic that, “...to the degree that
the guardians' job is most important, it requires the most freedom from other things, as well as
the greatest craft and practice.”8 The guardians, or philosopher kings, represent the highest order
of the soul, which is reason. Just as the ideal city has three distinct classes so too does each
human soul contain these three elements. The philosopher kings must know what reality is and
understand the difference between being and becoming. In the same fashion, the highest order of
reason must inform and control the lower spirited and appetitive functions of the soul. For Plato,
the forms are the ultimate reality and are the universal standards by which we measure a
particular item's participation in the Forms.
The human body is separated from the intelligible world as the soul waits to be freed in
order to have complete knowledge of the Forms, this is the dual nature of human existence in
Plato. The term mind in Plato is used interchangeably, since the mind is expressed as an element
of a particular soul and therefore only shares in the Platonic Form of Knowledge. The structure
5

of human knowledge is illustrated by Plato's divided line, the line between the visible world of
belief and imagination and the world of Forms and knowledge of the Good. The line separates
the material world from which we ought to be liberated, from the intelligible world of Intellect
and Reason. Cultivation of the soul through education leads to knowledge of the forms and the
dialectic is the surest way to reveal the truth.
In Plato's Timaeus, the soul is made of the elements and “like can only be known by
like.”9 The Creator uses the elements and the harmonic ratios to organize the cosmos. The
universe is a complete and living thing that shares in the likeness of a complete god; it is a
harmony of proportion. “[I]t is a work of craft, modeled after that which is changeless and is
grasped by a rational account, that is, by wisdom.”10 Plato's cosmology constructs the world's
soul in three stages. The creation of the mixture of indivisible, changeless being with the
divisible is a mixture of Sameness and Difference. The second stage is the division of the
mixture into portions and the final stage is the filling of intervals.11 The soul is a mixture of the
ideal forms of Same, Difference and Being. Plato's account of how the soul moves the body is
given to us as an outcome of their interconnectedness. Aristotle states that, “...Plato identifies
the movements of the soul with the spatial movements of the heavenly bodies.”12 In the works of
Aristotle, change is certain and the Prime Mover is unmoved.
For Aristotle the form cannot be removed and given an ideal essence for which all others
must participate in. He also rejects Plato's notion of the soul as a spatial magnitude because the
mind's movement is not circular. “But the mind is one and continuous in the same sense as the
process of thinking; thinking consists of thoughts.”13 The mind is also capable of thinking a
thought only one time, “...if the same revolution recurs frequently, the mind must frequently
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think the same thing.”14 For Aristotle, the mind is separate from the perceptive faculty of the
appetitive soul. The form is the animating soul, which is the principle change of matter into the
composite substance that is individual life. This process is achieved by Aristotle's concept of
hylomorphism.
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HYLOMORPHISM
Hylomorphism is the combination of matter of the body and form of the soul. The
explanation of hylomorphism must contain Aristotle's four causes of material, formal, efficient
and final cause. Matter has potentiality and is actualized by its form, a composite of form and
matter can have essential form, like the human body, or accidental form, which it can lose and
still exist. “The soul is an essential form, whereas perception involves the acquisition of
accidental forms.”15 The body cannot lose its vital principle and still contain the potential for
life. The soul of any living being or natural body is the primary source of change and motion.
A problem has been raised against the hylomorphism theory that is found in Aristotle's
philosophy. Shields states the problem as such:
A hylomorphic account of change seems to require that bits of matter are
only contingently enformed; the bronze is not made the bronze it is by
gaining this or that shape. Instead, the bronze is the bronze it is because of
its being an alloy of copper and tin, something it was before it was
enformed by the shape of Hermes, something it remains while enformed
by that shape, and, of course, something it is still after that shape has been
lost. If human bodies are not bodies when they are not ensouled, and if the
souls of bodies are, as Aristotle claims, their forms, then human bodies are
not amenable to a hylomorphic treatment.16
The human body is not so certainly incapable of receiving a hylomorphic treatment. The soul is
the principle of organization and the first actuality of the body, in the sense that the body now has
life and contains within it the potential to continue living by the exercise of its power.
Potentiality precedes actuality; therefore a body that has actualized its ensouled form is in
energeia. In the act of realizing its potential, the living being has possession of knowledge and
so is realized. Once it no longer has its life giving soul, it no longer contains any potentiality. A
soul is potentially alive at the time that it is actually alive. In the same fashion, the mind does
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not actually exist until it thinks. That is not to say that there is ever a time when a living being is
without a mind, for the potential that is required to be living exists at the same time that the being
is alive. Life cannot have one without the other. The mind is realized in energeia, which is to
say that the mind is realized while it is at work. The problem raised by Shields is found in the
inadequacy of the analogy of an inanimate statue to the animate living being. Bronze does not
decay. All living bodies lose their forms upon death. To put it another way, the living body
loses its motion and potential. The bronze material does not lose its potential to change into
another statue or a coin.

THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
Aristotle's investigation into the soul makes no sense without the body. For him it is
essential to understand why the soul is in the body and what conditions make this possible. The
soul is not a harmony and it does not move in a circle. The soul is the principle movement by
which man thinks and learns. The body receives the soul and must be the correct type of matter
for the particular kind of soul as, “each craft must employ its own tools, and each soul its own
body.”17 The body is material cause of the soul's actualization of its final cause. “So one need
no more ask whether body and soul are one than whether the wax and the impression it receives
are one, or in general whether the matter of each thing is the same as that of which it is the
matter; for admitting that the terms unity and being are used in many senses, the paramount
sense is that of actuality.”18 This passage gives us a starting-point from which to discover the
ultimate place of the mind in the form-matter composite. It also allows us to set aside the mind-
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body problem, for the purposes of this work, as this is not the same problem for Aristotle as it is
for Descartes. A substance that is subject to hylomorphic change is actualized in the movement
by that which has potential in matter and the passive mind.
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THE ARISTOTELIAN SOUL
For Aristotle, the soul is the first actualization of that which is potentially living. This is
to say that the motion of change provides the potential for life and is life in itself. Living is what
distinguishes things with souls from those without and being alive is the internal potential by
which we have the power of self-sustenance, growth and decay.
The soul is defined by its relation to matter and is the form of the particular body. There
is no one common soul, but particular kinds of souls. The soul has the different capacities of
nutrition, perception and mind; it can also have the faculties of reasoning, thought, locomotion
and sensation. An “account of each of these faculties is also the most relevant account that can
be given of the soul.”19 In general, the soul is the essence of the body, or “substance in the sense
of formula.”20 The soul is a vital constituent in the unity of a living organism. The soul is “one
in actuality but many in potentiality,” and Aristotle tells us that the faculties of nutrition,
sensation, thought and movement originate in the soul and the soul is defined by them.21
Aristotle appears to use the word decay in two ways. First he tells us that there are four
kinds of movement: change of position, change of state, growth and decay.22 It is clear here that
he does not consider decay to be a change of state. Life of a natural body is the capacities of
nourishment, growth and decay.23 This means that decay is a natural function of any living being
and the individual being has not undergone any chance of state in the process of decay. He also
seems to use decay in relation to the contemporary notion of decay as related to decomposition.
In Book I chapter 5, it is stated that, “[s]ome say that the soul has parts, and thinks with one part,
and desires with another. In this case what is it which holds the soul together, if it naturally
consists of parts? Certainly not the body: on the contrary the soul seems rather to hold the body
11

together; at any rate when the soul is gone the body dissolves into air and decays. If then some
other thing gives the soul unity, this would really be the soul."24 But the soul's movement of
decay is not the decomposition of the corpse of a once living being. Shields states that, “...a
body which has lost its soul is not a body at all, „except homonymously‟ ...Aristotle means to
suggest that a body without a soul is no more a body than an eye in a sculpture of a human being
is an eye. We do call it an eye, but only by an extension of the term.”25 Therefore the decay of
form is not the body's decomposition after death, but rather the old age of the body‟s material
substance. Aristotle states that, “...old age is due to an affection, not of the soul, but only of that
in which the soul resides, as in the case in drunkenness and disease.”26 In this passage as a
whole Aristotle is talking about the mind as an independent substance, which is imperishable.
It is Aristotelian to say that when the mind is the highest capacity of the soul, the kind of
soul peculiar to humans is best defined by the mind. All other capacities serve to actualize the
thinking that is the entelécheia of the mind. Some examples of actualization include the activity
of imagination, the recollection of a memory, or the exercise of attained knowledge.
The life activity of plant life is the work of the nutritive soul that can grow and reproduce.
The nutritive is the most natural of all the functions of the soul. “[T]he nutritive soul belongs to
all other living creatures...and is the first and most widely shared faculty of the soul, in virtue of
which they all have life.”27 Aristotle rejects mechanical accounts of growth, “...for growth is a
constrained pattern of development,” the source of which Aristotle ascribes to the soul and he
takes it as evident that growth in organisms proceeds along structured paths, in end-directed
ways.28 Nutrition along with the capacity of perception and touch are found in the animals.
Touch is a universal sense-faculty that every animal possesses. The ensouled human being is a
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rational soul and the intellect is what differentiates humans from the animals. The body is
potentially alive only when it is actually alive, for one cannot actualize anything without the
potential to do so.

PERCEPTION
Perception is directed towards “sensible qualities rather than intelligible forms” and is
best understood by Aristotle's hylomorphic model of change.29 Perception comes from the organ
capable of receiving the information and being changed or affected by alteration. “Sensation
consists...in being moved and acted upon; for it is held to be a sort of change of state.”30 The
change is when the organ proper to the particular type of perception acquires the form of what is
perceived. “The sentient subject... is potentially such as the object of sense is actually. Thus
during the process of being acted upon it is unlike, but at the end of the process it has become
like that object, and shares its quality.”31 It is important to note that the subject becomes like the
object of sensation, and that it shares in the qualities of that which is perceived.
Only the proper organ can perceive the object of sense. A literal interpretation of the
likeness, in the passage above, of the proper organ is the one with “an ability to share by coming
to exemplify the sensible qualities which they are structured to receive.”32 On the other hand, an
intentionalist interpretation takes the likeness of the sense organs to mean that, “the sense organs
become like their objects without actually coming to exemplify the sensible qualities perceived.
Instead, they become like them by coming to symbolize them in one way or another...the likeness
involved in perception [is] akin to the likeness obtaining between a house and its blue print.”33
Saint Thomas Aquinas, and Franz Brentano both suggest that Aristotle does not mean that the
13

eyes and nose actually take on the qualities of the object of perception, but rather one becomes
aware of some color or smell.34 What the explanation of a literal interpretation is missing is that
we do not perceive one single characteristic at a time but many different, and at times conflicting
sensations. As Aristotle states that the soul's thinking capacity is occupied by the forms only
potentially.35 The movement of the soul is what animates the matter of the body. Perception,
memory and imagination all require the body; it is the body that remembers and perceives.
Aristotle states:
Thus the power of thought and speculation decays because something else
within perishes, but itself it is unaffected. Thinking, loving and hating, are
affections not of the mind, but rather of the individual which possesses the
mind, in so far as it does so. Memory and love fail when this perishes; for
they were never part of the mind, but of the whole entity which has
perished. Presumably the mind is something more divine, and is
unaffected.36
Aristotle tells us that practical thinking and perceiving are not identical because all animals share
in perceiving, but thinking only involves a few of them.37 At this point one might infer that only
humans think. This may not be a logical inference as this is not what the text actually says. No
translation of Aristotle used for this paper uses the terms human thinking or human mind. When
there is an existential instantiation of a specific example of thinking, a particular kind of human
is given, such as a scientist. But there is room for animals to participate in thinking. Thinking
can be found in more than just the kind proper to the human being. For instance, imagination is
said to be a part of thinking and it is also a capacity of the animals.
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THE IMAGNIATION
Imagination is a sort of thinking, but is to be differentiated from rational thinking. The
imagination is not one of the faculties of the soul that are incapable of error, “...such as
knowledge or intelligence; for imagination may be false.”38 For Aristotle, imagination is a
blending of direct perception with opinion. The ontological status of the imagination, for
Guttenplan, is in between perception and thought. He states that:

[T]he treatment of phantasia (usually translated as 'imagination') in
Aristotle's De Anima III.3, seems to regard the imagination as a sort of
half-way house between perception and thought, but in a way which makes
it cover appearances in general, so that the chapter in question has as much
to do with perceptual appearances, including illusions, as it has to do with,
say, imagery. Yet Aristotle also emphasizes that imagining is in some sense
voluntary, and that when we imagine a terrifying scene we are not
necessarily terrified, any more than we need be when we see terrible things
in a picture.39
Opinion involves the object of perception and belief. “[N]o animal has belief, but many have
imagination...every opinion is accompanied by belief...but although some creatures have
imagination, they have no reasoning power.”40 Imagination is not treated, as Guttenplan says, as
though it appears between perception and thought, it is a form of thinking. Aristotle tells us that
thought is distinct from perception, and is composed of imagination and judgment.41 The
discursive thinking of the rational mind is what separates us from the animals. Contemporary
understanding of intelligent animals such as whales and dolphins may prove to be examples of
other minds that are only different in the kind of thinking it is capable of. As Aristotle tells us,
the universality of soul, which is form, only differs in kind.
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THINKING
Chapter four of Book III of De Anima is concerned with the part of the soul that knows
and understands. Aristotle has stated before this point that the soul is the origin of movement, but
in Book III he states that, “thinking seems more like a state of rest or a halting than a movement;
and the same thing is true of the syllogism.”42 If the mind is nothing until it thinks and the soul
is the source of movement in the matter of the body, then the highest capacity of the soul,
actualized in thinking, is both at rest and the ultimate source of movement in the ensouled and
rational being. It is in this way that the active mind is of the same essence as the Prime Mover.
The mind knows because it is unmixed and contains potentiality. For Aristotle, all thinking has
limits and, “speculation is bounded like the verbal formulae which express it. Every such
formula is a definition or a demonstration.”43 The act of demonstrating knowledge is limited by
the material form. Wedin tells us that for Aristotle the mind thinks itself in the relation between
the mind and its objects, “...whenever one actually thinks (when the mind is identical with the
object of thought) then the mind thinks itself.”44 When the mind is identical with the object of
thought, the mind has actual knowledge of the form of the object. “Actual Knowledge is
identical with its object. Potential is prior in time to actual knowledge in the individual, but in
general it is not prior in time.”45 Potential must be present at the same time the movement of the
efficient cause is in actualization.

16

THE MIND
The highest order of soul is the mind, where thought and understanding are held by
knowledge of universals, whereas sensation is of particulars. It is certain that for Aristotle, the
human mind is an exceptional capacity of the soul. It is how we can reason and develop ethical
behavior. “[I]t is impossible that anything should be superior to and control the soul, or (a
fortiori) the mind; for it is reasonable to suppose that the mind is by nature original and
dominant, but they say that the elements are the first of all existing things.”46 Yet the mind does
not always think and it has no nature proper to it.47 The mind has no characteristics of its own,
“except its capacity to receive.”48 This is the reception of potential. The Aristotelian mind is
unmixed and impassive. Aristotle tells us that:
“[I]n the case of the mind and the thinking faculty nothing is yet clear; it
seems to be a distinct kind of soul, and it alone admits of being separated,
as the immortal from the perishable... other parts of the soul are not
separable, as some say; though it is obvious that they are theoretically
different; for there is a difference between the abstract faculties of
sensation and opinion, just as feeling is different from opining.”49
“The mind is not defined as the actualization of any set of physical structures (like other
faculties' natures) [this] explains why it is nothing until it thinks...the mind may well depend on a
complex of physical structures... without being the actualization of any such structures.”50 This
statement defuses arguments that the mind, for Aristotle, may exemplify the qualities of the
objects of consciousness. “It is necessary then that mind, since it thinks all things, should be
uncontaminated...in order that it may be in control, that is, that it may know; for the intrusion of
anything foreign hinders and obstructs it. Hence the mind, too, can have no characteristic except
its capacity to receive. That part of the soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I mean that part
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by which the soul thinks and forms judgments) has no actual existence until it thinks.”51 The idea
that the mind does not exist until it thinks means it is nothing other than its actualization in the
thoughts or judgments of the rational being.

THE MIND THINKS ITSELF
Aristotle believes that the mind is itself an object of thought, just as other objects are.
This is a rather esoteric idea, and at first the transcendental phenomenological reduction enters
into the horizon of inquiry. But does he mean that the mind can be abstracted from and
considered as an object of consciousness? I think that Aristotle is trying to understand how it is
that the mind exists before it thinks some bit of information. As the faculty proper to
Knowledge, it must contain the potential for it before it can know. “For in the case of things
without matter that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for speculative
knowledge is the same as its object.”52 Aristotle questions the act of thinking as an actualization
by the mind that is separate and not acted upon. Aristotle also speaks of the mind as not being
dependent on the body and indeed some part of it continues on after death. This transcendental
capacity of the mind may have influenced Descartes' turn inward to the self, in which, by the act
of cogito, he is certain that while thinking, he is a thing that exists.

FUNCTIONALISM
Some believe that Aristotle's concept of the soul is a form of, or precursor to,
functionalism. Cohen defines functionalism as, “...the theory that mental states are defined in
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terms of their relations to causal inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states. It holds that
several different physical states or processes may realize the same mental state. Mental states
cannot, therefore, be reduced to physical states. They are, rather, functional states of the physical
systems that realize them.”53 Aristotle tells us that its relation to matter defines the mind and
therefore matter can be assigned as a causal input, which is to say it is the material cause. The
plausibility of applying functionalism does not necessarily hinge on the argument for multiple
realizability of a single mental state or process because Aristotle is clear that the mind is
dominant and the active mind is separate and unmixed with the material cause. The mind can be
taken as irreducible to the physical state of the material cause.
The main objection to functionalism is in agreement with the conclusion reached above
in the interpretation of the likeness of the proper organ's ability to exemplify the sensible
qualities that they are able to receive, rather than actually changing the matter of the organ.
Perception is of accidental forms and then only potentially, not actually.54 This is related to
Aristotle's idea about actual knowledge, which is identical to its object. Knowledge and
sensation correspond to reality. Burnyeat believes that we cannot escape the Cartesian concept
of our physical existence by looking to Aristotle. Burnyeat states that:
“To be truly Aristotelian, we would have to stop believing that the
emergence of life or mind requires explanation. We owe it above all to
Descartes that that option is no longer open to us. Hence all we can do
with the Aristotelian philosophy of mind and its theory of perception as the
receiving of sensible forms without matter is what the seventeenth century
did: junk it. Having junked it, we are stuck with the mind-body problem as
Descartes created it, inevitably and rightly so. The modern functionalist
should be grateful to Descartes for having set him the problem to which
functionalism is supposed to be a more satisfactory solution than Cartesian
dualism. For the moral of this paper's history is that new functionalist
minds do not fit into old Aristotelian bodies.”55
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It is not necessary to choose between functionalism and dualism, if we take the thinking activity
of the mind, and thereby the actuality of the mind, as a property of what I call active and passive
mind property dualism. In this sense, the two properties of the mind, the impassive activity and
the destructible potentiality are two radically different properties, which are within a frame of
non-reductive functionalism. The distinct characteristic of the active mind is its infinite Being.
This Being is fundamental to the actualization of Socrates as a discrete substance; the active
mind in this sense enables a human to be the subject, upon which things are predicated. These
are the dual properties of the mind. White speaks of a similar notion of property dualism in his
essay, where he looks for the metaphysical location of mathematics in Aristotle. White sees
Aristotle as rejecting substance dualism, for a “property triad-ism.” White's piece is a highly
technical work of analytic philosophy, but I believe that the following passage allows for the
possibility of property dualism in Aristotle's metaphysics. He states:
Aristotle is rejecting what may be termed a version of 'substance dualism'
or 'substance triad-ism'. We may want to distinguish and, indeed, in some
sense 'separate' (i) sensible properties of a thing, (ii) physical
properties...of that thing, and (iii) the thing's mathematical properties. We
may even want to deny that any of these three groups of properties is
'ontologically reducible' to any of the others. But we are not thereby
committed to three co-existing substances or three types of substance
occupying the same spatial locus. Such a distinction between substance
triad-ism and property triad-ism seems sufficient to allow Aristotle ...to
maintain that the metaphysical locus of the objects which mathematicians
study is the sensible, physical world.56
The sensible property of the mind would be its activity and the physical property would be its
material cause, and the mind's mathematical property would be the functioning of its actuality.
Furthermore, this mind property dualism theory allows for the study of the soul to remain in the
order of a physicalistic functionalism. The emergent property of the dualism of the two
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properties of the mind, the active mental state and the passive mental state, would be ethics and
discursive thinking. The mind‟s dual properties are two fundamentally different properties that
are fully integrated with the material cause. The passive mind contains the potential needed to
actualize the emergent properties, which are to be the final cause.
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THE ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MIND
The fifth chapter of Book III of De Anima considers the active and the passive mind.
There Aristotle tells us that in the soul, just as in the entire universe and all of the classes of
objects, the distinct elements of matter and the soul's cause or agent are related just as art is
related to its media and tools. The passive mind becomes all things and the active mind makes
all things. Aristotle explains the mind by the analogy to light, saying “...this is a kind of positive
state like light; for in a sense light makes potential into actual colors. The active mind in this
sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is essentially an activity; for the agent is
always superior to the patient, and the originating cause to the matter.”57 If the mind is
essentially an activity and is separate from and cannot be acted upon by anything, then what is
everlasting is the activity it has initiated and participated in. It is a force that is itself unmoved.
Aristotle clearly states that the mind does not think intermittently. The mind, when
isolated to its true self, is immortal and everlasting, and without the active mind nothing thinks.58
The passive mind is perishable and the active mind does not remember any previous activity.
The passive mind presents its potentiality for aid in the entelechy of a substance's final cause.
But what is the ontological status of the active mind, once isolated to its true self? Aristotle
thinks of it as being of the same nature as the Prime Mover,59 but this does not necessarily place
it outside of the physical universe. To understand just what the active mind is, we should focus
on the ways it is compared to light.
Aristotle also uses an analogy to light when speaking about imagination. He states that,
“[s]ince sight is the chief sense, the name Phantasia (imagination) is derived from phaos (light),
because without light it is impossible to see.”60 If the active mind is nothing more than its
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activity, which is a positive, experienced state like light, and the imagination is a derivative of
such activity, then the everlasting, imperishable active mind is nothing more than a physical
property of the whole of nature, id est, energy. Viewed in this way, the active mind is a form of
energy that is defined in a way similar to energy, as we know it, that obeys the first law of
thermodynamics. Farabee states a great explanation of the law of thermodynamics as: “The total
amount of energy and matter in the Universe remains constant, merely changing from one form
to another. The First Law of Thermodynamics (Conservation) states that energy is always
conserved, it cannot be created or destroyed. In essence, energy can be converted from one form
into another.”61 The change referred to in this statement must have a beginning, for Aristotle
rightly rejects infinite regress on the grounds that nothing is in a state of becoming in the infinite.
Anything that exists in the infinite, necessarily always exists there. Therefore, the change that is
a constant in the Universe must have an efficient cause. That cause is the Prime Mover and is of
the same nature as the active mind, which is the cause of the change from what is potential into
actuality. As stated above, something that is in the state of actualizing potentiality is said to be in
energeia, or actively existing. When the active mind is actually a thinking mind it is the soul
movement of a living being. A plant, which is without a thinking mind, is the form (soul or
movement) of nutrition and is actualized in various materials. The active mind is superior to the
nutritive soul and is therefore the primary energy of the living being which possesses it. As
Aristotle is quoted earlier to say, the mind is dominant. Perhaps we do not participate in the
nutritive soul in any other way than the fact that we eat plants.
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PHYSICALISM
A weak form of physicalism can be supported by the text. Aristotle does not speak about
allegorical tales of the afterlife, as does Plato's Socrates. His thesis on the active mind is clear in
that the mind does not remember after death. It is a force that serves to actualize the potential
that is found in the material cause of a being. An individual person's final cause is to think and
reason. Aristotle places much emphasis on ethics and logic as the ultimate good.
Aristotle uses “topic-neutral” language when speaking about the mind as opposed to
when he speaks of the physical phenomenon.62 This may be because of his limited knowledge of
the physical universe, or it may be because change and motion are central to his metaphysics and
the four causes of the physical world are most important to the understanding of the mind. As a
modern day reader, I am free to impose a non-reductionist physicalism to his philosophy of
mind. The mind cannot be reduced to a physical property of the material cause, and is clearly
thought to be superior. This leads us to the conclusion that a minimal form of physicalism is a
better fit. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stolijar states that the “Argument from
Causal Closure” is the idea that “every event that has a cause has a physical cause.”63 This fits
into the idea that the efficient and final causes must have a material cause in order to be realized.
Stolijar writes, “ non-reductive physicalism is a form of emergentism, the view that
supervenience provides a way to interpret the relation between the psychological and the
physical in such a way that the psychological is genuinely novel.”64 The property of
supervenience proper to the mind is found to be the dominant capacity over the physical body.
This is not substance dualism because the human is a composite substance and to lose either the
formal or material cause is to cease to be human. The active mind implies the potential
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contained in the passive mind. The emergent property of this dualism is discursive thinking and
rational discourse; those features of the mind that only appear when the formal cause of the being
is dominated by the active mind.
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CONCLUSION
There are parallels to be found in the ideas of contemporary philosophy of mind to the
works of Aristotle. In applying terms to his work, great care is taken. The possibility of
misinterpretation and categorical mistakes is real. There is much of value to be found in his
work on the subject of the mind. The idea that the mind's essential nature is its activity should
remain in any philosophy of mind. The philosopher of mind should be mindful of the forms of
movement and the four causes of change.
Careful consideration should be made when reading Aristotle as no one part can be taken
on its own. Although there are problems with transliteration, the truth can still be found in the
whole of his works. Aristotle does not believe in the Platonic world of Forms. The form is
always with its material cause and the movement of the physical universe is best defined by the
change from potential to actual. This change can be different in different forms, but the
universal principle of movement is the same. The form without the material cause is knowledge.
The similarities between Plato and Aristotle are not a failure to move beyond the teachings of the
master to student, but rather these similarities display the truth of human existence. The
commonality between the two philosophers is a sort of intersubjectivity, as the truth reveals itself
in the other. The universe moves as a sort of symphony of parts for each of them. It is the final
cause that is so different.
The Aristotelian mind is best viewed as a form of functionalism that is a non-reductionist
physicalism. As a result of active and passive mind property dualism, human reason and rational
thinking emerge as an actualization of its form. This is not reducible to its material cause; it is
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rather a form of emergentism. At the same time, the mind cannot realize its final cause without
the physical body.
The mind property dualism of the human soul is a distinct theory from other forms of
dualism. It is not the dual nature found in Plato, as Aristotle does not believe that the Platonic
Forms can exist independently. It is not substance dualism because the composite form and
matter substance is a single substance. It is not dualism of mind and body as Descartes
understood it to be, because for Aristotle the body is a necessary component for the composite
substance of the individual natural body to be realized. This is related to the four causes, in
which the final cause is the ultimate goal of reality. For Aristotle, the most important sense that
unity and being are used is in that of actuality. In the actuality of the human mind there is a unity
of body and form, and a unity of potential with the active mind. Mind property dualism is not
the same as traditional property dualism because it is not the consciousness that is the emergent
property. Logic, rational discourse and ethical behavior are the emergent properties of the
composite substance. These properties are not reducible to any organ. Sense perception is
achieved by the organ proper to the perception of the object of sense. The absence of a proper
organ for the active mind eliminates the possibility of predicate dualism.
What we are left with is two, radically distinct properties of the mind. The active mind,
which is unmixed and eternal, that actualizes the potential found in the passive mind. The
passive mind contains all the potentiality that is necessary to realize the human capacity for
reason and the potential needed to be a human substance. Contemporary notions of embodiment
and situated cognition are supported by hylomorphism and the active and passive mind of
Aristotle‟s philosophy of mind.
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Aristotle believes that nothing thinks without the active mind. Above, arguments for the
possibility for animals to participate in particular kinds of thinking were made in connection to
the capacity of imagination. In connecting these two ideas, one might reasonably suggest that
Aristotle views the mind of all animals to contain the active and passive mind property dualism.
The difference between the different kinds of souls would be realized in the composite form,
according to the potential found in the material cause. Only when the material cause is the
human form does the rational mind emerge.
This is the mind as Aristotle describes it in De Anima. Sir Isaac Newton once wrote in a
letter, “If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.”65 Aristotle is such a
giant. Although Aristotle may not have all the answers to the philosophy of mind in his work, I
firmly object to the suggestion to junk it. There is much more to be learned, and this essay is my
eikos mythos.
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